This op-ed examines the widening gap between active European investigations and domestic procedural paralysis, revealing how high-level accountability in Lebanon’s biggest financial crime case has effectively moved abroad.
Photo · Photo by Gaetan Marceau on Unsplash
German prosecutors seized $42 million in assets linked to Riad Salameh in January 2026. Yet Lebanon’s domestic courts have still set no trial date and recovered no significant funds more than six years after the 2019 financial collapse. The contrast is stark. While European authorities continue to trace and freeze assets allegedly diverted through the Forry Associates scheme, Lebanese proceedings against the former central bank governor remain locked in procedural loops. The latest development, a postponement of key interrogations in the Forry case to 11 June 2026, fits a now-familiar pattern: formal activity without resolution. For ordinary Lebanese who lost savings in the crisis, this divergence raises a fundamental question. If meaningful accountability is happening only outside Lebanon, what does that reveal about the state’s own capacity to deliver justice?
European investigations have produced the most tangible outcomes to date. In late January 2026, German prosecutors seized commercial properties and shares in Munich, Hamburg, and Düsseldorf valued at approximately $42 million. These assets are linked to commissions paid by the Banque du Liban to Forry Associates, a company beneficially owned by Salameh’s brother Raja. The German action builds on earlier freezes in France and Switzerland, where authorities have pursued money-laundering and embezzlement allegations involving hundreds of millions of dollars routed through European banks and real estate. These cases benefit from dedicated financial crime units, stronger banking transparency rules, and the ability to act on assets located within their jurisdictions. They do not require a final Lebanese conviction to freeze holdings or issue warrants. The result is visible pressure: assets seized, public records established, and ongoing legal processes that keep the files active.
In Lebanon, the picture is different. Salameh was indicted in January 2026 on charges of embezzlement of public funds, forgery, and illicit enrichment in the $44.8 million consultancy account case. That file was referred to the Court of Cassation, but no trial date has been scheduled. The separate Forry Associates investigation, which centres on roughly $330 million in alleged commissions between 2002 and 2015, has seen repeated delays. A planned interrogation session was postponed to 11 June 2026 after Salameh’s legal team challenged the investigating judge. Salameh has been free on substantial bail since September 2025. He remains in Lebanon under a travel ban. Banque du Liban has joined some proceedings as a civil plaintiff seeking recovery. Yet the overall pace of domestic justice remains glacial. Appeals, recusals, jurisdictional shifts, and procedural reviews have become the dominant features of these cases rather than exceptions.
The pattern reflects deeper institutional dynamics. Lebanon’s judiciary operates within a confessional power-sharing framework where appointments and sensitive case handling are influenced by political balances. High-level financial files encounter multiple layers of review: investigative judges, indictment chambers, and the Court of Cassation. Each layer offers opportunities for delay. When cases touch former senior officials with extensive networks, institutional caution or outright resistance becomes more pronounced. This is not simple inefficiency. It is a systemic outcome in which the judiciary absorbs major corruption cases without producing final verdicts or recovered assets. The central bank’s partial cooperation as a civil plaintiff shows some institutional evolution, but it has not overcome the structural barriers that have protected high-level figures since the 2019 collapse.
Lebanese depositors who lost access to their savings in 2019 watch as European courts seize assets that might otherwise be available for domestic recovery. This externalization of accountability carries a heavy price. It reinforces public cynicism about domestic institutions and reduces pressure on Lebanese authorities to complete their own processes. At the same time, it limits the state’s ability to claim full sovereignty over justice in what is fundamentally a Lebanese scandal involving public funds. Economically, the absence of credible domestic resolution complicates Lebanon’s position with international partners. The IMF and donors consistently link larger support packages to governance improvements, including progress on high-level accountability. Without visible results in the Salameh files, reconstruction financing after the March 2026 displacement crisis and banking sector reform remain harder to secure.
The Salameh files are not an isolated case. They exemplify how Lebanon handles its most sensitive financial crime investigations: enough formal movement to deflect criticism, but insufficient resolution to deliver justice or deterrence. This approach preserves elite impunity while shifting the burden of real enforcement to foreign jurisdictions that have no obligation to prioritise Lebanese interests. Until Lebanon establishes genuinely independent judicial timelines, shields prosecutors from political influence, and creates enforceable mechanisms for asset recovery, the most significant movement in its landmark corruption cases will continue to occur abroad. The German seizures of January 2026 and the ongoing European probes demonstrate what is possible when political constraints are removed. Domestic courts have yet to match that standard. The Salameh files are moving, just not in Lebanon. That reality should trouble anyone who believes accountability for the 2019 collapse must ultimately be delivered by Lebanese institutions to Lebanese citizens. Without a credible domestic process, the files risk becoming another symbol of state failure rather than a vehicle for justice.
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